Succession and political stability in Saudi Arabia

• PRABHAT PRAKASH

Succession to the next generation poses a threat to the Saudi Kingdom's stability as it will create "a complex web of rivalry and political competition" among Saudi princes who wish to secure their family lines.

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For the last 60 years, the crown has been passed on to Ibn Saud’s many sons who have continued his family line. So, by extending this principle of succession it can be argued that if the crown is passed to the next generation, that branch of the family will dominate the coming successions and eliminate other family lines.

Succession to the next generation may pose a threat to the Kingdom’s stability as it will create “a complex web of rivalry and political competition”1 among Saudi princes who wish to secure their family lines. House argues that historical precedent suggests that the system of brotherly succession has created family feuds in the past, which have led to the collapse of previous Saudi states. The second Saudi state, she contends, was toppled in 1891 due to Al Saud brothers fighting for dominance2 . There were others like, Saud bin Abdulaziz (son of Ibn Saud), who when in power drained State resources and left the nation bankrupt.

In Saudi, the King holds the ultimate power and by that token it can be argued that he is the sole decision maker. But there is historical precedent that suggests that important decisions are only approved by the King once consensus has been reached. This was evident when in 1990s, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz (son of Ibn Saud and the current King) was trying to liaison with foreign oil companies but the decision was delayed because the step was being opposed by the members of House of Saud. This form of decision making has its root in the Bedouin tradition, where decisions are taken by consulting the heads of different tribes. It can be suggested that the Bedouin tradition is not for maintaining equality but to guarantee loyalty. A society which has not embraced western style democracy and is based on a system of hierarchical superiority where the pace of reform is influenced by its rigid and conservative political system, it is essential to keep these isolated tribes content because regional tensions can infect the Kingdom and trigger instability.

Regression and unpredictability

Al- Rasheed argues that Saudi Arabia can be defined as a kingdom in regression which is, “plagued by regular reshuffling of princes and lacking energetic leadership with a serious vision for the future”3 . By extending this argument of constant instability in the kingdom, it can be suggested that any succession due to its sheer complexity is open to conflict. Reshuffling can also be seen as a way of redistributing wealth in Saudi Arabia, as governmental seniority brings opportunities to make financial gains. Al-Rasheed calls this a ‘balanced and orchestrated game,’ which upholds the principles of the Bedouin tradition. The unpredictability and ambiguity of the Saudi succession system creates an illusion that all contenders to the Crown have an equal chance of becoming the King and therefore reduces the probability of voices being raised against the status quo. This hinders the possibility of future reforms.

Karasik draws comparisons between Saudi and the Soviet Union by arguing that “Saudi Arabia right now is looking a lot like the Soviet Union did at the end of its empire in terms of ageing leadership and switching leaders quickly because of sudden deaths.”4 However, it will be naive to believe that Saudi will have the same fate as the Soviet Union because both are distinct in their internal and external policies. Today’s challenges are different from those of the post Cold War era and Saudi’s close economic ties with the US and its strong regional position makes the political climate of the Kingdom unique. America’s vested interest in Saudi Arabia both in terms of oil and its crucial role in aiding the US to maintain the regional stability or insatiability are of prime consideration.

Factors affecting succession

There has been a great amount of speculation among diplomats, academics and the business industry about the internal workings of the House of Saud. Different factions of the international community have different priorities and therefore hold a distinct conception as to what the decision making process entails. It can be argued that if one is well versed with the internal dynamics of the Royal family, it will aid the process of predicting decisions taken by the King. However, it would be ignorant to believe that House of Saud functions in isolation and external factions do not influence the dynamics within the Kingdom. These external factions tend to include a wide variety of stakeholders including State and non State actors. In order to understand the Saudi political system and succession it is pivotal to consider some of these rational and irrational actors who have the potential to influence Succession.

Religion and politics

Understanding the Saudi-Wahhabi relationship is pivotal to analyse the operations of the State. Yamani argues that the region can be defined in terms of struggle for mastery of the Muslim world. It can be suggested that this struggle includes two major regional players, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both can be perceived as expansionists and promoting their sect of Islam 5 .This is evident from the lengths the Saudi-Wahhabi regime has gone to promote their politico-religious ideology. Bronson elaborates on this and contends that King Fahd spent over $75 billion to build religious schools and Mosques 6.

The importance of religious organisations is well established in Saudi Arabia. When in 1963, King Saud refused to give up the Crown, the Ulema intervened and appointed Crown prince Faisal as the new King. This proves the kind of power the Ulema holds in Saudi society. This can be seen as a classic example of a symbiotic relationship between religion and politics. In Saudi, the leadership has often used religious organisations to legitimise their rule, as this provides the decisions taken by the government a religious backing which in turn gives the religious authorities a position of respect in civil society. Marines agrees with this and suggests that the relationship between the Ulema and the Government can be viewed as one which is exemplified by interdependence7 .

The Ulema in Saudi can also be compared with the Iranian Supreme leader in that it is seen as a institution of high importance, but the Ulema, unlike the Supreme leader, does not enjoy an official status and is mainly used as a tool of political and social legitimisation. Therefore, it can be suggested that due to the Kingdom’s history and the role religion played in its formation, the State cannot function without a body that upholds its religion. Salame posits that the Saudi political system can be defined in terms of theocracy. But by viewing the political system in such narrow terms, the importance of local identities and societal values are ignored8 . These regional differences provide Saudi’s with a sense of identity which plays a crucial part in Saudi politics that is based on regional inclusion.

In March 2013, a prominent cleric denounced the harsh sentencing of two human rights activists through an ‘open letter’, in which he argued that, “There is smoke and dust on the horizon. We are justified in worrying about what lies beyond. If the security agencies tighten their grip, it will only worsen the quagmire we are in and cut off all hope of reform,” 9 this is an example of the discord between the administration and the religious authorities that has shaped Saudi politics. Now the call for reform is not only wanted and argued by the minorities or the underrepresented liberals but also other sections of the society. It will only be logical to contend that maintaining Saudi-Wahhabi relationship is essential for Kingdom’s stability.

Royal women

Henderson argues that the Royal women play an important part in Saudi politics and hence succession. It can be suggested that due to the prominence of intermarriages within the House of Saud, the women represent important families in the Kingdom and can therefore build alliances between different branches. Henderson employs the example of how King Fahd used to summon the women of al-Saud and discuss his views. This can be seen as an extension of the Bedouin tradition and importance placed on building consensus.

American influence

The U.S.-Saudi relationship is defined by necessity rather than choice. US have vested interests in the region and Saudi’s strategic position aids US in tackling regional dilemmas. Saudi Arabia also plays a ‘leadership’ role in promotion and conservation of Islam, both as a religion and an ideology. It is often argued that the relationship between the two nations makes Saudi Arabia seem like Americas de facto colony. Sampson suggested that from early 20th century when US oil companies invaded Saudi, the State has learned to survive through international necessity rather than internal legitimacy10 . US also controlled Saudi Arabia through being its ‘international protector’. Throughout the 20th century, US aided Saudi in its military operations and remained its prime supplier of weapons. However, Yamani argues that this has hindered Saudi from developing its own military capabilities. Saudi has also used US to maintain its role as the regional power. A stronghold in the Kingdom has aided US to take and often dictate decisions to other regional players. Therefore, US will ‘want’ a leader that is sympathetic to the US cause and wishes to build a relationship based on consensus and help maintain US’s position in the region.

Henderson argues that nature of this symbiotic relationship has often been determined by the personality of the King11 . King Fahd was considered sympathetic to the US and his decision to allow US military during the 1991 Gulf war alerted the region but reaffirmed his alliance with the US. Blanchard argues that the Obama Administration has cooperated with Saudi authorities on both regional and internal issues12 . King Abdullah has continued this interdependent relationship but has taken a more cautious approach.

Succession and regional influences

Since the region has been defined through a history of conflicts and intervention from the time of the Ottoman Empire, it can be suggested that its borders and people are not immune to change initiated by violent conflicts. Until now, Saudi has not been affected by the dramatic geopolitical changes in the region but to ensure this stability it will have to take calculated steps. Saudi plays an important role in the region but this can also prove problematic for its succession plans. Its constant discord with Iran over its internal politics and its role as an aggressor in the region has made the two countries regional rivals. It has been argued that in order to contain Iran’s power, Saudi should appoint a more dynamic leader. It is contended that currently Saudi is “politically incapacitated” and America and the Gulf countries should push forward for reform in the Kingdom13 . It can be suggested that the US can play an indirect role by encouraging GCC countries to engage in dialogue with the Royal family and establish a basis for developing a multilateral dialogue to strengthen the plans for succession into the next generation. Saud bin Faisal (son of Ibn Saud), has advocated a dialogue with GCC countries regarding Iran, but its prospects were halted due to the alleged assassination plot against the Saudi Ambassador in Washington14 .

The Emir of Qatar has passed the Crown to his son, Tamin Bin Hamad Al Thani15 . If Saudi follows the Qatari precedent, there is hope for internal reforms in the Kingdom as a younger leadership can bring a fresh outlook in liaison with the religious authorities to lighten the conservative mood in the country. Qatar in the last 30 years has been transformed into a major regional player which has formulated a highly assertive foreign policy. However, it will be inaccurate to compare Saudi and Qatar, as both countries have distinct demographics. Qatar is not plagued with many of Saudi’s social problems like youth unemployment and income inequality. Qatar, owing to its disproportionately small size and the wealth generated from its natural gas reserves, give it a per capita rate four times that of Saudi. Cunningham argues that the Qatari succession should not be seen as a shake-up but a mere shuffle, the main purpose of which is to send a signal to its regional rivals and the international community of its modernising nature16 . There are commonalities between the two Gulf States, such as their aggressive stand towards Iran. In that sense, an alliance between the younger generations over geopolitical issues can prove beneficial.

Orderly succession, political reforms through consensus and regular consultation to promote regional harmony will contribute to stability within Saudi Arabia and in the West Asian region as a whole; stability vital for peace and harmony in the world at large.

(The author was a Research Intern at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)

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  1.    “The Political Outlook of Saudi Arabia”, Chatham House Reports. May 2011

  2.    House, Karen. On Saudi Arabia. Alfred A. Knope (2012)

  3.    Al-Rasheed,The unpredictable succession plan of Saudi Arabia. April 23 2013

  4.    Katy Watson, “Saudi succession raises Economic Challenges.” BBC News 26 June 2012

  5.    May Yamani. (2009). From fragility to stability: a survival strategy for the Saudi monarchy. Contempory Arab Affairs . 2 (2), 90-105.

  6.    Bronson, R., 2006. Thicker than oil: America’s uneasy partnership with Saudi Arabia. New York: Oxford University Press.

  7.    Marines, Alejandra Galindo (2001) The relationship between the ulama and the government in the contemporary Saudi Arabian Kingdom: an interdependent relationship?, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3989/

  8.    Salame, Ghassan (1987). “Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia” in Arab Studies Quaterly 9, (3): 306-325.

  9.    Editorial. (2013). House of Saud: built on sand. Available: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/02/saudi-arabia-editorial

  10.    Sampson, A., 1975. The Seven Sisters: the great oil companies and the world they shaped. New York; Viking Press.

  11.    Simon Henderson, “The Saudi Way.” Wall Street journal, August 2012

  12.    Blanchard, C. (2012) “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S relations”. Congressional research service.

  13.    Simon Hendreson . (2013). To stop Iraa, get a new Saudi King . Available: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/to-stop-iran-get-a-new-saudi-king/267013/.

  14.    Blanchard, C. (2012) “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S relations”. Congressional research service.

  15.    “Qatari emir Sheikh Hamad hands power to son Tamim”. BBC. 25 June 2013

  16.    Finian Cunningham. (2013). Qatar power transfer simply PR exercise triggered by Saudi rivalry. Available: http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/06/27/311025/saudi-rivalry-behind-qatari-pr-shuffle/.

Need of the hour is a Smart Border

• JOYEETA BHATTACHARJEE

• BORDER
• URI

The terrorist attack on a military base camp in the border town of Uri in Jammu & Kashmir calls for re-visiting the existing border management practices. On September 18, armed terrorists attacked the military base at Uri causing the death of 17 army personnel. The militants belonging to Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed infiltrated in Jammu & Kashmir through the heavily guarded international border to carry out terrorist activities in the State.

The Uri incident was not the first when militants infiltrated from across the border to mount an attack on the Indian Armed Forces. The strike followed within eight months of the Pathankot attack where militants intruded from Pakistan and attacked an Air Force base. Repeated acts of terror from across the border led to rigorous introspection in the Government for developing measures to avoid such tragedies.

Authorities are pondering over both diplomatic and military measures. There is a need to strengthen security at the border. Smart border or use of technological equipment for border guarding stand as a viable option.

India has a total of 15,106.7 kilometres of land border with countries including Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar and Bhutan. With Pakistan, India shares 3,323 kilometres running through States including Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir, with varied geographical features.

It was Pakistan-based terror which disturbed Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab and forced  India to focus on border management. Securing borders and thwarting any activity that is hostile to the country’s interest have been the objective of India’s border management approach. Accordingly, India deployed the Border Security Force to guard our borders with Pakistan. Since infiltration by terrorists has been a key challenge for the border guards, it took additional measures like erecting barbed wire fencing and installation of flood lights along the international border with Pakistan. Experiences suggest these measures are not sufficient.

The traditional response to the challenges faced in the border will be to deploy more personnel in the border. According to the annual report released by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, the authorities have already increased number of border outposts in the international border with Pakistan.  With terrorists becoming more assertive and tech savvy, its time for transforming our border management practices also.

Normally, smart border is understood as an arrangement among the neighbouring countries that would improve border security, information sharing and law enforcement cooperation between the two nations and ease movement of people and goods. Following this definition, questions might arise about the efficacy of smart border, as it requires cooperation between neighbours. It needs to be recalled that technology is key to smart borders. The focus here is more on the use of technology. In the context of Pakistan, the connotation for smart border will have to be altered. Smart border here means technology-driven solutions for border security. There is a need for using highest technological solutions to secure our borders. This process should not be seen as a bid to the demilitarisation of the border but complementary to the efforts taken by security forces.

In a limited manner, the Government has taken some initiatives in engaging technology in securing the border. A dozen of laser walls are installed in the India-Pakistan border in Punjab, particularly, in areas which are vulnerable to infiltration.

Smart borders will not only strengthen our security infrastructure but also can go a long way in reducing the loss of valuable lives of our soldiers. Besides, the idea has a potential to boost innovation in Indian companies and research institutes, which could develop cost-effective technologies. Once the smart border comes into operation fully, the Government can explore numerous opportunities in future. The smart border mechanism can be another feather in the cap of our Armed Forces.

This commentary originally appeared in The Pioneer.

President Trump: An opportunity, a danger — or both

• RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN

Photo: Matt Johnson

• DONALD TRUMP
• TRUMP
• TRUMP TRANSITION

A month after his victory and a month away from actually taking the oath of office, President-elect Donald Trump is clearly overturning Washington’s established foreign policy consensus. The implications of the strategic changes Trump is introducing are quite profound, if they actually become policy. It could indicate that the US will now play a much more central role in maintaining a strategic balance in Asia and possibly drive a wedge between China and Russia. This should be welcome in New Delhi, where most strategic analysts have been puzzled by the US reluctance to take on China, a stronger adversary, while haranguing Russia, which is too weak to pose much threat to the US. But Trump’s foreign policy and style have dangers also that New Delhi must consider as it tries to figure out how to deal with a radically new Washington.

On the campaign trail, Trump was lambasted for what the Washington Post characterised as an “incoherent, inconsistent, incomprehensible foreign policy.” After he won the election, opinions on his foreign policy did not improve much. But nevertheless, there is a core consistency in Trump’s strategic approach: it is defined by a hardline approach to China and a softer view of Russia. This upends decades of US strategic policy, which took a harder line on Russia and a softer approach to China.

There was a logic to such an approach during the Cold War, when Russia represented a more serious threat. But the Russian collapse at the end the Cold War, and China’s resurgence over the last two decades, did not lead to the necessary strategic reappraisal in Washington. Instead the US continued to mollycoddle a rising China, and worry and irritate a weakened Russia, driving Moscow into Beijing’s arms. Despite rhetorical recognition of US’s growing relative weakness, there was little attempt in Washington to reassess the consequences of the changing balance of power between the US, China and Russia, let alone adjust US policy to this change.

Trump’s approach dramatically shifts America’s strategic weight against China, while at the same time potentially splitting the emerging Sino-Russian axis. Both elements of his approach — countering China as well as partnering Russia — are very visible. His most dramatic intervention so far has been in setting up a congratulatory phone call with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, a break from a tradition of several decades of the US President not talking to Taiwanese leaders. After some initial surprise, China’s response has gotten angrier, but Trump has pushed back too. This is another change: until now, all it took for a US administration to scamper for cover was a raised Chinese eyebrow. Trump is signaling that China cannot unilaterally set such red lines.

This needed to be done. The US has for too long stepped back rather than confront China, even though the US has gained little by way of Chinese cooperation. Such confrontation carries risks for both sides, but these are risks that both sides should cooperate in avoiding, and it is not US’s sole responsibility. US reluctance to challenge China so far has only appeared to embolden China, not lead to China’s cooperation. Righting this balance was long overdue. For example, on Taiwan specifically, China has succeeded in creating the impression that the US accepts China’s “one-China” policy, though the US position itself is somewhat more complicated, as John Tkacik points out. An additional, unintended benefit, has been that Trump’s hardline on China has garnered Trump greater support within the Republican strategic community.

Trump’s tough approach to China should generally be welcome in the region. If the Trump administration is truly willing to use America’s weight to right the increasingly skewed balance of power in the region, that can only benefit the region, and India.

The other side of the equation, of warmer feelings towards Russian and President Vladimir Putin, has also been highly visible and indeed much more controversial. It has generally been met by with puzzlement or else with ridicule, as an indication of Trump’s strongman tendencies which reveal itself in his love for other strongmen. Even Republicans have opposed Trump’s views on Russia, with several former Republican officials signing an open letter disapproving it, though the base of the GOP and even some leaders have supported Trump. Trump has refused to criticise Russian intervention in Ukraine and Syria, or even Russian hacking of the Democratic party and the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign.

Strategically, closer ties with Russia makes sense for the US. Russia, save for its nuclear weapons, is a much weaker power today, but one that is valuable to China for a variety of reasons including its diplomatic clout, its military technology and its natural resources. Preventing a Russia-China axis should have been a major US strategic objective, which should not have been too difficult considering these are neighbours that have had a history of political and territorial conflict. Instead, American and European behaviour forced Moscow to seek alignment with China. This is not to excuse Russian behaviour in Ukraine or Georgia or Syria, or its threat to the Baltics. But an easier way to ensure Russian cooperation in all these cases would have been to find a modus vivendi that would have provided security for both Russia and its smaller neighbours. Trump’s revision of US policies towards Russia is thus also long overdue.

An America partnering with Russia and containing China is an ideal opportunity for New Delhi and for the rest of Asia. For India, Russia has been historically a close strategic partner and the US a new one, and it would be difficult for New Delhi to maneuver between them if they are on bad terms. While the US is without doubt a more valuable partner today, India cannot easily ignore its dependence on Russia just yet. And a Sino-Russian partnership would be a serious strategic headache for India. Thus there is little doubt that India stands to benefit if Trump brings US and Russia closer and splits Russia from its entente cordiale with China. Russia may be less important to the rest of Asia, but anything that limits China’s power would obviously benefit them too.

Unfortunately, this rosy strategic picture has a number of blemishes that New Delhi would be wise to consider too. The most important is that it is not clear that Trump is basing his approach on any careful consideration of strategic choices. So far, neither Trump nor his supporters or campaign have presented any well thought strategic rationale for his choices, leading to the unsettling conclusion that these are random thoughts that have internal logic and consistency only by chance. As Thomas Wright recently argued about Trump’s foreign policy, “it is hard to say if small actions are part of a coherent strategy or if he is simply winging it.” If this is a valid conclusion, the danger is that US strategy could change very quickly, if Trump falls out with Putin or if China is smart enough to find a way to appease or appeal to Trump. India, as well as Washington’s other allies and partners, need predictability and dependability from the senior partner in the alliance. It is early days yet, of course, but Trump needs to generate some confidence that there will be some stability in his approach, possibly by outlining a strategic rationale for his policies.

Second, much of Trump’s criticism of China has to do with China’s mercenary trade policies that exploits liberal trade unfairly. Trump has repeatedly blamed China for stealing US jobs, though data has consistently shown that the vast majority of manufacturing jobs lost in the US is due to automation, not China. Though China can make some concessions — on currency valuation, or greater market access, for example — it is unlikely that Beijing will be able to satisfy Trump’s demands. The consequences, if Trump is serious, could be a trade war that could escalate to beggar-thy-neighbour policies that will leave not only China and the US worse off, but seriously damage the other Asia Pacific economies, including those of India and Japan. The US needs to counter China and oppose China’s unfair trade practices, and it might lead to a trade war if China is obdurate, but a trade war cannot be the starting point.

Third, Trump’s focus on China’s trade policies also suggest the additional danger that if China is able to successfully negotiate a deal with Beijing, the US might cut a separate deal with Beijing and leave its allies in the region in the lurch. Of course, this is a problem for all allies at all times — think of poor Taiwan itself — abandoned because the US decided that it had bigger fish to fry. The evidence on this so far in a Trump administration is mixed. On the positive side, Taiwan, the first point of tension, is a political rather than an economic issue, and many of Trump’s advisors are concerned more about the political and military challenge that China presents than simply trade issues. On the negative side, Trump has been harsh about free riding allies and appears far more unilateralist in his approach, suggesting he does not see much use for allies, or at the least, that allies will have to walk behind than alongside the US. It is too early to figure out which of these tendencies will prevail.

This leads to the final point: the role of allies in Trump’s strategy. American strategy until now has been to enroll allies in its strategic projects, not because the US can’t go it alone but because it is cheaper and more legitimizing to have others support you. Trump seems to think of allies only in terms of the former, as a way to reduce US material burden. On the one hand, this is not a new issue: US has for decades tried to get its allies — from Europe to Asia — to bear a fair portion of this burden. On the other hand, the US has never threatened to walk away unless it is paid, as Trump has implied. Even the most unilateralist of US administrations, George W. Bush’s for example, understood the need of alliances as legitimising tools. The Trump administration needs to realise this too.

For US allies and partners in Asia, US unilateralism has both benefits and risks. If the US is willing to balance China on its own, it absolves allies and partners of both the political cost of joining an anti-China group as well as the material costs of balancing, while benefiting from China’s containment. But the downsides are also great: a fire in the region will singe everyone. An additional concern for US allies will be that a volatile Trump will need to be handled with kid’s gloves: the usual practice of cursing Washington for six days in a week and expecting its help on the seventh might no longer apply.

For the last decade, the problem was that the US seemed to ignore the rising challenge from China and Washington’s policies only seemed to strengthen Beijing. US allies in Asia were desperate for the US to step up. Trump’s efforts to befriend Russia and balance China makes perfect strategic sense. The problem is that it is not clear that it is strategic.

• ISSUE BRIEFS AND SPECIAL REPORTS
• JUL 19 2016

Beyond #Brexit: What Ails the European Union?

• SAMIR SARAN
• BRITTA PETERSEN

• BREXIT

We are all refugees, Zaventem Airport, Brussels | Courtesy: Alfred Grupstra/CC BY 2.0

The European Union (EU) had been lurching from one crisis to the next even before a majority of British voters expressed their desire to leave it. While staying away from the Brexit debate itself, its implications for UK and EU, and the politics and motivations in the run-up to the vote, this paper argues that at the very least the referendum is a wake-up call for Europe to begin to address some of its structural and operational shortcomings in a substantial manner. Accordingly, a few observations from ‘a’ Indian perspective are put forth and may be worth considering as the EU moves towards a renewed and reformed version of itself.

Specifically, this paper reflects on three particular challenges the EU faces, and the four fundamental weaknesses that continue to hobble it: that of being perceived as a status-quoist power; of being unduly trans-Atlantic in its orientation; of promoting values often at the expense of enlightened self-interest; and of a persistent structural inability to communicate to the world at large.

Introduction

Rumours of the death of the European project are, as Mark Twain would have put it, vastly exaggerated. Examples for its continued relevance and efficiency can be found in the European Union’s outreach to Iran that paved the way for a diplomatic breakthrough, its continuing efforts to absorb Syrian war refugees, and its clever geo-economic manoeuvres that have effectively contained Russia’s sphere of influence across Central and Eastern Europe. But the condition of the union has, without question, deteriorated rapidly, to everybody’s surprise. The current period of flux is an ideal time for a dispassionate analysis. It is undeniable that ‘Brand EU’ is taking a beating and it is time to unpack where the scepticism and perceived frailty stem from.

The first of the three most visible challenges to the project has to be that this strong collective of European nations has achieved only patchy social integration within its members. The gastarbeiter model adopted by Germany in the 1960s and 70s may have addressed short-run labour problems but was not efficient in assimilating newcomers into society. Furthermore, as former colonial powers, the UK and France opened their doors to their former subjects (for a short period) but their policies over time proved inadequate in addressing longstanding grievances. None of the existing models in individual member states of the EU can be termed a full success.

Muslims make for about four to five percent of Europe’s population, with the ratio considerably higher in France. According to the PEW Research Center, this figure will rise to eight percent in 2030. European Muslims have long blamed structural societal problems as key reasons behind a permanent ‘Otherisation.’ This phenomenon effectively undermines their integration by overriding the significant contributions of Muslim immigrants to the European project. As noted French scholar Gilles Kepel remarked, “neither the blood spilled by Muslims from North Africa fighting in French uniforms during both World Wars nor the sweat of migrant laborers, living under deplorable living conditions, who rebuilt France (and Europe) for a pittance after 1945, has made their children … full fellow citizens.” [1]

Arguably, an immediate consequence is the emergence and consolidation of radical Islamism and its twin, racist-rightist politics. At the very least there is certainly a degree of resonance in certain constituencies. Consider the notable rise of the far-right Front National (FN) in France, led by Marine Le Pen. In the December 2015 regional French elections, 6.8 million French citizens — one out of ten — voted for FN. [2]  The unabated rise of Le Pen and FN will be of significant consequence in the French presidential elections of 2017. France is not alone in seeing the rise of the extreme right. Austria just narrowly escaped the election of a right-wing populist, Norbert Hofer, as president. They are now heading back to the hustings, with an unpredictable outcome. From the UK Independence Party in Britain and the Alternative for Germany in Germany, to Hungary under prime minister Viktor Orbán, liberal EU is now grappling with two illiberal ideologies, with all member states experiencing varying degrees of this new reality.

The EU’s second challenge lies in the economic sphere, the touchstone of the European integration project. The EU finds itself caught in the inevitable confusion that comes from being a monetary union without being a fiscal union. The periodic eruption of the Greek tragedy arises from this cleavage. Greece’s woes can be traced to two fundamental problems. One, its economy did not fulfil the convergence criterion laid out in the Maastricht Treaty to begin with. In January 1998, on the eve of the formation of the EU, the Greek inflation rate was 5.2 percent against the reference rate of 2.7 percent and the EU average at 1.6 percent; similar statistics hold for other macroeconomic parameters such as public-debt/deficit-share-of-GDP, and interest rates. [3] Second, fiscal independence meant that there was very little oversight from Brussels on Greek spending or its lax attitude towards tax collection. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 exacerbated these fundamental problems that are unlikely to go away any time soon. But even when solved, individual European countries will have to deal with the fact that compared to emerging countries such as China and India, their economies will only stay relevant on a global level if tallied. [4]

Segments of EU’s population already feel the heat. Part of the far-right political discourse is based on the discontent of a new generation of Europeans who know that they are the first after World War II to be economically less well off than their parents. European democratic parties so far have failed to come up with a new narrative to respond to the angst among these people and prevent them from embracing regressive, authoritarian solutions. [5]

The third challenge to the EU is what can be called the return of history in the form of Vladimir Putin. While the fall of the Berlin Wall was a moment of triumph for Western Europe, developments thereafter have not progressed favourably, especially since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis that culminated in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. A deep misunderstanding aggravates the situation. Europe believed that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it was now in a more friendly and settled neighbourhood. It abdicated a realist position and did not invest in follow-through diplomacy that could have produced different and more sustainable outcomes.

What is important is to draw the right conclusions from this mistake: The belief that at the end of the binary world order one side prevailed (that is, Europe and the US) is still part of a Cold War mindset and results in a winner-takes-all proposition, limiting room for accommodation.

The rise of a multipolar world poses a whole new set of challenges, but Europe has thus far failed to develop a new vision for itself and forge new alliances. For a long time Giovanni Thomasi di Lampedusa’s famous line, “Everything needs to change so that everything can stay the same” [6] was the quintessential European mantra. No more. The old continent with its shrinking population and low economic growth rates will be only one centre of gravity in what emerges from the current global disorder. If managed well, this need not be a disadvantage. But it would mean rethinking the gospel of Monnet [7] and a few long-cherished ideas of what Europe is and should be, as articulated by its founding fathers.

Towards EU 2.0: Rebranding an old project

Based on the above analysis, there are essentially four issues, from an Indian point of view, that problematise what the EU could potentially offer to the world. To begin with, as a brand, its perceived central proposition is behind the times. The rise of a multipolar world poses a whole new set of challenges, but Europe has thus far failed to develop a new vision for itself and forge new alliances. From reforms of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to those of key Bretton Woods institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European powers are seen to want more of the same.

Europe has two out of the five permanent seats in the UNSC, though only representing seven percent of the world’s population. It is clearly over-represented in this particular marquee club. India’s 2005 bid to a UNSC permanent membership through an alliance with three other aspirants — Brazil, Japan and Germany — fell by the wayside partly due to an obstructive strategy by the UK and France. [8] Both these powers supported Germany’s bid, although given the fact that Europe is already over-represented in the UNSC, UN General Assembly members were unlikely to allow another European power to become a permanent member. As one commentator noted, “the UK and France were effectively condemning the prospects of UNSC reform and thereby preserving their permanent seats even longer.” [9]

European countries hold 26.45 percent of voting shares in the IMF while the EU-28’s share of world GDP is 17 percent, down from 30 percent in 1980. [10] Historically, the chief of the IMF has always been a European, much in the same way that the World Bank chief is always, as a matter of norm, an American candidate. The origin of these biases lies in the manner in which IMF and other Bretton Woods institutions were created. These were shaped by the vision of two men, British economist John Maynard Keynes and US Treasury official Harry Dexter White. While Keynes argued for the need for a truly international clearing currency — the “bancor” — White’s vision was for a system which was attuned to the interests of the US.[11]The latter is what dominated the compromise at the end. Many see this lack of European leadership as one (though not the only) reason behind the slow pace of reforms of Bretton Woods institutions.

While some European powers do realise that this posture may not be sustainable — witness their enthusiasm for the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — they are either unwilling or unable to upend the existing global governance order and allow it to be refashioned according to 21st century realities.

Need to relocate Europe’s place in the world

The second issue seems to be Europe’s conception of the map – and its place in the extant geography of the world. Europe must realise that its future is to a large extent coupled to that of Asia’s and Africa’s. Instead of a serious institutional push towards building a common future with the powers that will shape these two regions, Europe has functionally de-hyphenated itself from both. When Europe has engaged with these two regions it has done so myopically, based on its colonial ruminations or as illustrated by its trade policies.

The EU and the US are currently negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) — a wide-ranging free trade agreement that mirrors the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership in the Asia Pacific. Signing the TTIP and not pushing ahead on important under-discussion bilateral FTAs, like the India-EU Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement, will further orient European economies to the US. Meanwhile China, the EU’s second-largest trading partner, is yet to be granted Market Economy Status (MES) by certain EU member states, something that ought to be automatic by December 2016 as per China’s 2001 WTO accession agreement. [12] If China is not granted MES, and the TTIP is signed, it will be clear to Asian states that the EU will continue to orient its trading regimes to those of the US, to the detriment of Asia.

Geopolitically, the record of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in engaging the Middle East and North Africa has been tepid, despite its participation in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. [13] This is odd, since terrorism and the unabated influx of migrants pose some of the greatest challenges to Europe. [14] Even when NATO engaged the Middle East through these two mechanisms during the Libyan campaign in 2011, NATO’s promoters in the UNSC — the US, the UK and France — failed to secure a buy-in from countries like Brazil and India. India’s permanent representative to the UN remarked that “responsibility to protect cannot turn out to be a tool legitimizing big power intervention on the pretext of protecting populations from the violations of human rights and humanitarian law.” [15] Indeed, Paris found multiple reasons to consult Washington for guidance on its Syria policy, but found little motivation to engage New Delhi. There is little doubt that if Paris had been in a habit of seeking and heeding advice from India — likely only if both countries saw each other as important partners in their common periphery — the situation in the Middle East may have been remarkably different today, given India’s significantly different approach. The end result of the lack of policy convergence between European and non-Western powers (India, for one, remained wary of the Syrian intervention) has resulted in the former being perceived in non-Western capitals as nothing more than a geopolitical appendage to the US.

Europe’s penchant for trans-Atlanticism is a sentimental anachronism. While many in Europe might believe that only a close alliance with the US can defend what are perceived as Western values, such as democracy, human rights and a market-based economy, the reality is quite the contrary. It is the very nature of these values that make their imposition on others impossible without digressing from their liberal ethos. The value-based alliance between the US and EU has only reinforced the impression that Europe is too busy consolidating the old-boys’ club by any means to realise that the geopolitical centre of gravity is inexorably marching eastwards. Obsessed with the Atlantic Order, Europe is near absent in the great debates of the Indo-Pacific.

The corollary, therefore, is that EU and more broadly Europe are inefficient in promoting their economic interests and are unable to stitch together new partnerships to keep their periphery stable. A new engagement with the emerging economies of Asia and Africa, a new partnership with them that will allow new voices to manage the world economy and politics, and the realist appreciation that such an engagement is not just a political compulsion but actually a credible actualisation of the original objectives driving the European project, must now form the basis of a revised set of “European values.”

Grammar of values: Perpetuation of interests?

This revision of the “values” discourse is essential as the old one is failing. Effectively, the tyranny of values — whether it is as self-proclaimed champions of human rights, or of liberal multiculturalism — has, in recent years, cost Europe in real-politik currency. Europe’s promotion of norms was driven by self-interest in the past. A world remade in its own image was a self-serving agenda from the colonial era to the Cold War, with tangible material benefits. Its coercive assimilation of migrants in its own image took forward the same agenda. The British mission civilisatrice — liberal beliefs driven by religious beliefs — or the French promotion of egalité and fraternité — by force, if necessary — or Bismarck’s nationalism all had the hallmarks of great-power politics, and not of “the visionary designs of the philosophers and the physiocrats.” [16]

What Europe has engaged in since is either promotion of self-determined values and norms divorced from immediate political interests; or the hypocrisy of publicly promoting values that it chooses to ignore whenever business interests intervene. In partner countries such as India, this has led to the impression that the EU needles its negotiators with supposed human rights concerns but uses this as an excuse to slow down the pace of finalising cooperation agreements and treaties. [17] All this while, its businesses and corporates continue to derive huge material benefits and invest large capital in China and other geographies with patchy human rights records. This has neither improved bilateral relations with key partners nor has it helped to strengthen the human rights agenda.

Even at home, this has led to the establishment of an inelastic value system that seeks to enforce conformity on those who see the world differently. Arguably Europe’s problems with integrating minorities in its national mainstream are partly a consequence of this social inelasticity. France’s experiment with banning the niqab in 2010 is a case in point. A scholar who had studied the impact of this ban summed it with a simple phrase: “It has been a complete failure.” This scholar went on to point out that it “both encouraged Islamophobia as well [as gave] Muslim extremists more cause to feel the need to rise up against the French state.” [18] While this may be an extreme commentary, there is significant discontent with the policy.

While France, Great Britain and Germany have chosen different ways of dealing with their immigrant populations, these efforts all remained within a hierarchical discourse where the migrant somehow has to adopt to a culture that is immutable and inflexible. Recent events in this geography call for a new political discourse about the changing identity of the collective, its revised values, its new vision, perhaps even a new Renaissance. [19]

Indeed, EU needs to reimagine itself and its identity through a dialogue with its own immigrants from Asia and Africa. There is a flawed conception of history and philosophical thought in certain quarters. Since Antiquity and the Middle Ages, there has been a long history of mutual influence between Europe, the Islamic World and Asia. Trying to create a more or less exclusive identity based on Christianity and/or the Enlightenment was always limiting, [20] and it has perhaps become untenable now.

Europe needs to live up to the reality of its composite culture not only to remain credible internationally, but also if it wants to maintain social peace and use the opportunities that immigration offers. A dialogue with India and other countries seeking to manage their individual diversities may be another new conversation that the EU could enter into.

Rebranding and communicating EU

The above problems are compounded by the fact that ‘Brand EU’ has a serious marketing and communication problem. Brussels has made very little effort to engage the world beyond the borders of Europe in any meaningful way, to great consequence. At a meeting between European and Indian scholars in 2015, both sides bemoaned the lack of communication initiated by the European side. A large part of the problem lies with the channels through which news about the EU is transmitted to the Indian public. A scholar noted: “Opinions of the Indian elite have tended to be conditioned by dispatches in Indian newspapers which have originated in or were transmitted by Western wire agencies. Continued reliance on the Anglo-Saxon media has tended to reinforce stereotypical clichés about Europe.”[21] [Emphasis added]

A simple statistic proves the point that the EU has made very little effort to reach out to the world beyond its borders. In 2004, there were 23 newspapers covering Brussels from Belgium — 12 serving the Flemish-speaking community in the country, nine serving French speakers, and one serving German speakers. [22] In contrast, there were only four English language newspapers (print and online) operating out of Brussels — “The Brussels Times,” “New Europe,” “Europolitics,” “Politico: Europe.” Unlike Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Service regional language programmes or even Deutsche Welle, there is no truly European media operation that disseminates local language messaging to audiences outside Europe.[23]

Instead, there has been much hand-wringing about Russian propaganda and how Vladimir Putin is using traditional strategies of disinformation as part of its hybrid warfare in Ukraine. [24] In political circles and at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels almost everybody who is involved in public diplomacy and media relations laments the lack of funds and the fact that the Russian media has been more effective in proliferating messaging to wider geographies. This seems surprising to say the least, given the size and relevance of European media houses and Europe’s existing economic strength. But failing to influence global discourse is perforce a sign of weakness and should by itself be a wake-up call for Europe.

This situation is aggravated by the fact that American media is increasingly under criticism for their poor coverage of the EU. Noting the lacklustre coverage of the recent Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, one scholar wrote: “It’s true that EU stories are often hard to make interesting, but the American media has never really tried to do so for the entire past half century, during which the emergence of the European Union has been one of the world’s biggest geopolitical developments.” [25]  This ought to be of serious concern to EU policymakers and the public at large — the British and American media have become the de facto channels through which the world beyond the global north receives news about Europe. And if the past is an indicator, it is unlikely that these channels (US and UK media) will offer their audience coverage that is sympathetic to the EU project. For many in these two countries, this project is seen as one where the ascendancy of two countries in global affairs, France and Germany, may have upended the order that emerged at the end of WWII in Europe.

EU public diplomacy has been fairly ineffective in large parts of Asia and Africa. Positive messages that the EU could communicate to countries and regions to its east have been muted, crowded out by narratives emerging from euro-sceptics in Britain and the US. Therefore, the EU seems to be in the news in countries like India mostly for the wrong reasons. It is time Europe take a hard look at its messaging, the medium, and at the concrete steps it needs to take to establish and reinvent itself among such constituencies. All the more, Brussels needs to do it alone without expecting favours or support from London or Washington.

Pranayam for the EU

While the EU project originated from, and belongs to the 20th century, its success and relevance will nonetheless help shape the 21st century, a period that may well witness the rise of Asia. The EU, therefore, must ensure that it brings on board a larger set of stakeholders who are co-invested in this period and by implication in a new European project.

This requires a broader understanding of the project itself. For too long it has been shaped by a limited understanding of its own identity that was sometimes called a “Christian club.” This version of European identity might have suited some interests for some time, but it is outdated and needs rebooting. History is witness that European identity was always shaped by intensive exchange with its larger region and that periods of voluntary seclusion were usually not the most fruitful ones. Outreach to the external regions and to new constituencies within must be the new mantra for the EU.

The EU also needs a paradigmatic shift in its policy towards Russia. While a reversion to the “Cold War mindset” may seem to be the easiest way out of the current stand-off with Moscow, it is certainly not the most productive. While the Crimean genie cannot be put back in the bottle, the EU must aim for a partnership of equals with Russia in the future. This will most probably require extensive dialogue, much of which will fail, and several rounds of negotiations, many of which will lead nowhere. It may need to swallow some bitter pills, and that may be difficult. But the alternative, a new cold war or hot peace, will be costly and painful.

Further, the EU needs its own rebalance to Asia. This new pivot to Asia cannot be an adjunct to the US policy but must be shaped by EU’s three principal dependencies on the Asian continent — economics, security and people (migrants). Sustainable economic growth, the fight against terrorism and social peace in Europe all depend to a large extent on relations with various African and Asian countries and communities. It is high time to make ties with Asia a priority in EU foreign policy and allocate the necessary intellectual and financial resources for the effort. The economic imperative that drives Europe towards the East must effectively also come to define its strategic consensus. The stability of the region, and indeed the world’s economic engine, are premised on the conduct of major powers in Asia, whether China, Russia or India. The post-war trans-Atlantic regime was built on the edifice of economic necessity, which transformed into a shared understanding of security concerns. History may not repeat itself—and China is certainly no replacement for the US on this count — but Europe should be as invested in the future of the Asian Century as it was in the post-war global order.

And last but not least: The EU must communicate beyond the elite. This is true for its diplomacy as well as for its domestic communications. Selling a relationship to the elite in India or China is perhaps already successful to an extent. The outreach challenge, however, is to make the EU understandable to the masses that remain more conversant with European countries rather than with the EU itself and whose appreciation of the collective is limited to the Schengen visa. Investing in greater number of and deeper university exchanges, engagement with the vernacular media, and using digital outreach — all need to be embraced to achieve this. The core determinant must be the ability to transmit a polysemic message from the EU.

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References

[1]     Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, http://www.cfr.org/religion/europes-angry-muslims/p8218.

[2]     Ian Bremmer, “Marine Le Pen Lost a Battle But May Win the War in France,” Time, December 14, 2015, http://time.com/4147837/marine-le-pen-france-regional-elections/.

[3]     Dominick Salvatore, International Economics: Trade and Finance (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2011).

[4] Jeanna Smialek, “These Will be the World’s 20 Largest Economies in 2030,” Bloomberg, April 10, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-10/the-world-s-20-largest-economies-in-2030#media-4.

[5] Ruth Wodak, Majid Khosravinik, Brigitte Mrai (ed.), Right Wing Populism in Europe. Politics and Discourse (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

[6] Giuseppe Tomasi die Lampedusa, The Leopard (London: Collins, 1960).

[7] Samir Saran and John C. Hulsman, “Wake up to the real world, EU!,” ORF Commentary, May 11, 2012, http://www.orfonline.org/research/wake-up-to-the-real-world-eu/.

[8]     Kishore Mahbubani, “To the New Order, Strategically,” Indian Express, February 4, 2014.

[9]     Ibid.

[10]    Share of IMF voting rights computed from “IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power,” IMF, updated April 27, 2016, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx. EU-28 share of GDP statistics from Sam Ashworth-Hayes, “The EU has Shrunk as a Percentage of the World Economy,” FullFact, June 9, 2015, https://fullfact.org/europe/eu-has-shrunk-percentage-world-economy/.

[11]    Jamie Martin, “Were We Bullied,” London Review of Books 35, no. 22 (2013), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n22/jamie-martin/were-we-bullied.

[12]    Shi Zinqin, “China-EU Relations: Crisis and Opportunity,” The Diplomat, March 15, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/china-eu-relations-crisis-and-opportunity/.

[13]    Christopher S. Chivvis, “NATO’s Southern Exposure,” Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-04-17/nato-s-southern-exposure.

[14]    Ibid.

[15]    Michael J. Boyle, “The Coming Illiberal Order,” Survival 58, no. 2 (2016), 53.

[16]    Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 8.

[17] Shazia Aziz Wuelbers, The Paradox of EU-India Relations: Missed Opportunities in Politics, Economics, Development, and Culture (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011) 98-105.

[18]    “Burqa ban five years on – ‘We created a monster’,” The Local.fr, October 12, 2015, http://www.thelocal.fr/20151012/france-burqa-ban-five-years-on-we-create-a-monster.

[19] Britta Petersen, “Demystifying the Refugee Crisis, Or Why Europe needs A New renaissance,” The Wire, February 19, 2016, http://thewire.in/2016/02/19/why-europe-needs-a-new-renaissance-22059/.

[20] The German historian Michael Borgolte, for example, argues that “Islam belongs to the foundations of European and German culture,” Qantara, May 19, 2016, http://de.qantara.de/inhalt/historiker-borgolte-der-islam-gehoert-zu-den-fundamenten-europaeischer-und-deutscher-kultur. Also on this topic: “When Europe loved Islam”, Foreign Policy, May 5, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/05/when-europe-loved-islam-interwar-weimar-republic-wilmersdorf-mosque/.

[21]    Rajendra K. Jain, “India-EU Strategic Partnership: Perceptions and Perspectives,” NFG Working Paper 10, July 2014, 17, http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCS_derivate_000000004250/wp1014-india-eu-strategic-partnership_0.pdf.

[22]    David Ward with Oliver Carsten Fueg and Alessandro D’Armo, A Mapping Study of Media Concentration and Ownership in Ten European Countries (Hilversum: Commissariaat voor de Media, 2004), 25, http://77.87.161.246/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/A-Mapping-Study-of-Media-Concentration-and-Ownership-in-Ten-European-Countries.pdf.

[23] Amrit Dhillon, “Deutsche Welle seeks more visibility,” The Hoot, March 18, 2016, http://www.thehoot.org/media-watch/media-business/deutsche-welle-seeks-more-visibility-9240.

[24] “The Hybrid War: Russia’s Propaganda Campaign Against Germany,” Der Spiegel, February 5, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/putin-wages-hybrid-war-on-germany-and-west-a-1075483.html.

[25]    Reginald Dale, “Most U.S. Media Get an “F” for EU Coverage,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Blog, April 29, 2016, http://csis.org/blog/most-us-media-get-f-eu-coverage.

[26] In India, pranayam is a set of breathing techniques within the yogic system that ensures good health and clarity of mind.